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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Banking and Finance at the 
International Hellenic University.  
The aim of this study is to assess the impact of the latest guidelines from the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, regarding the mitigation of market risk. The so-
called Basel 2.5 Accord introduced the use of a stressed Value-at-Risk (SVaR) approach 
obtained from one-year observations of a financially stressed period. The literature on 
the subject is quite limited, thus this study will enrich the existing literature with an up-
to-date analysis of how different models and procedures used to estimate market risk 
reacted during the 2008 financial crisis and how Basel 2.5 changed the market risk 
related capital charges. Six models were used for the estimation of VaR and SVaR for a 
period of 15 years, from 2001 to 2015, using the S&P 500 as a risk proxy. Moreover, a 
backtesting procedure was implemented to assess the performance of these models 
and the capital charges were calculated under both regulatory frameworks, backwards 
looking, as if they were in effect since 2001. Regarding the results, there is strong 
evidence against the use of the normality assumption and towards the use of the 
student’s t-distribution, especially for periods of crisis. Furthermore, adequate charges 
could be estimated even under the previous framework with the use of more 
sophisticated models. The new framework removes the incentive for the use of more 
complex models, that can better estimate the risk, through the flattening effect in the 
required capital, leading to the use of simpler methods that significantly underestimate 
risk in highly volatile periods while tending to overestimate the risk in periods of low 
volatility. This forces the banks to keep unreasonably high capital as a reserve in 
prosper times, preventing them from using it in a more productive way. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The banking sector is a very crucial sector for a healthy and well-functioning economy. Banks 
however, during their operations, face several risks that must be addressed, otherwise they 
can have a very negative effect on their operations and most importantly, through 
contagion effects, on the whole economy. The main risks they face can be divided into three 
major categories: Credit risk, Operational risk and Market risk. All the financial institutions, 
do not face the exact same risks, do not have the same exposure to them and may react 
very differently to an adverse situation due to firm-specific characteristics such as leverage 
or capital adequacy. Therefore, risk management plays a very important role in the banking 
sector. Risk management is the process of identifying the risks, measure and assess them 
and then take all the necessary actions to minimize the negative effects they can have on a 
bank’s financial results and capital. Despite the great importance of risk management in all 
financial institutions and especially in commercial banks, we are far from eliminating the 
exposure to risks. This happens because in many cases it is hard to identify all the risks, find 
models that can effectively measure them or take actions to manage them. In addition to 
that, managers in many institutions, in their effort to maximize their profits, neglect to take 
any precautionary measures, leaving the institutions and all the stakeholders exposed to 
great amounts of risk. Hence, it is obvious that banking supervision and regulation is 
essential to ensure that all banking institutions operate for the stakeholders’ best interests. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has contributed significantly towards 
better standards of prudency and regulation. The Committee provides a forum for 
cooperation on banking supervisory matters, having as an objective to improve the quality 
of banking supervision and enhance understanding of key supervisory issues. The 
committee has issued three main recommendations on banking regulation (Basel I, II and 
III) that are implemented by the biggest firms in the banking sector worldwide. 
The latest financial turmoil of 2008 however, was very hard to predict. The size of the crisis, 
the very complex financial instruments used by the banks, the high volatility and the rapid 
change of correlations among risk factors, caught the whole financial world unprepared. 
The Basel Committee was also not ready for that abnormal conditions, which is clearly 
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depicted in the existing regulatory framework at the time of the crisis. The framework was 
unable to predict the movements in the markets; thus, banks did not have the essential 
capital reserves and faced severe losses, mainly due to credit and market risk. The 
Committee, in order to prevent something similar from happening in the future, reacted 
immediately by publishing a new set of suggestions to cover market risk in 2009, with the 
crisis still ongoing. The new Amendment in the Basel II Accord (known as Basel 2.5) 
introduced a stressed value-at-risk (SVaR) approach, calculated from a year of significant 
financial stressed. In late 2010, Basel Committee expanded the new suggestions to cover 
credit risk too, with the Basel III Accord. 
Focusing on the market risk and Basel 2.5, the SVaR methodology that was proposed, 
contrary to the usual VaR methodology, has not been discussed thoroughly in the existing 
literature and only a very limited number of papers exist on the matter. Thus, this 
dissertation aims to shed light in the implementation of the latest guidelines and its effects 
on the calculation of market risk, as well as the relevant capital charges. At first Value-at-
Risk (VaR) is going to be calculated with six different methods, using the S&P 500 as a risk 
index. A 15-year period will be investigated, from 2001 to 2015, in order to evaluate how 
these models performed both during the crisis and the more common for the markets 
conditions following it and which model is more reliable. A backtesting procedure is going 
to be used for the verification of the results. Afterwards, the capital charges under both 
Basel II and 2.5 accords are calculated and an analysis is being presented on how the 
addition of SVaR affected the minimum capital charges required by the banks and whether 
SVaR is an effective measure or not is investigated. 
The rest of the study unfolds as follows. Chapter 2 includes the literature review and the 
main motivation behind this dissertation. At first, the Basel Accords with their main 
innovations, primarily regarding market risk, are briefly presented, and then the existing 
literature on VaR and SVaR is overviewed. In Chapter 3 the methodology used in the 
dissertation is highlighted, with analysis of the VaR models and backtesting procedures. 
Chapter 4 includes the empirical results of the study and a graphical representation of the 
main findings. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes with some final remarks of this examination. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
This chapter starts with a presentation of the Basel Committee and the three -so far- Basel 
Accords, focusing primarily on the market risk related regulations. A discussion follows 
about the VaR methodologies used and tested by professionals and academics and finally a 
review of the SVaR related literature.  
2.1 Basel Committee and Market Risk 
According to Heffernan (2005), the incentive for the formation, from the G10 countries, of 
a committee responsible for issues related to the regulation and the supervision of the 
banking system around the world, was the failure of two major international banks in 1974, 
Bankhaus Herstatt and Franklin National Bank. The first agreement presented by the 
Committee was the 1975 Basel Concordat, followed by the Revised Basel Concordat in 1983, 
which stressed out the use of consolidated data to supervise the activity and the 
performance of global banks.  
By 1988, the previous regulatory framework had become insufficient due to the increase in 
off-balance-sheet investments, the debt crisis in Latin America that deteriorated the capital 
ratios of many multinational banks and the growing international risk. This led the 
Committee to the introduction of the much more known first Basel Accord (Basel I), setting 
a standard of capital requirements, subject to specific risk-weighted asset classes. The 
wholeness of G10 countries’ banks with material international activities, had implemented 
the first Basel Accord by 1993 and were able to meet the minimum capital requirements set 
by the authority. 
As Basel I was solely oriented towards credit risk, the much more relevant to our subject 
market risk was not addressed until 1996, with the Amendment to the Capital Accord to 
Incorporate Market Risk. The aim of this addition was to apply capital charges related to 
market risk, defined as “the risk of losses in on- and off-balance-sheet positions arising from 
movements in market prices” (Basel, 1996a, b, c). The major innovation included in this 
Amendment was that institutions were allowed to choose between two methods to 
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calculate their capital charges: the standardized approach and the internal model approach. 
The latter method gave banks the flexibility to apply their own Value-at-Risk method as well 
as specify their own risk parameters, correlations etc. Despite the lack of specification about 
the exact VaR model that was to be used, banks had to meet strict qualitative and 
quantitative standards. Moreover, a backtesting procedure was incorporated in order to 
compare the model-generated risk measures with the actual ones, observed in the markets. 
This intended to provide incentive to risk management units to adopt concrete internal 
models, able to cover a variety of circumstances and efficiently calculate the corresponding 
capital charges, otherwise they would face appropriate penalties for poor performance.  
 The first Basel Accord had several flaws mainly regarding credit risk and the creation of 
“regulatory arbitrage”, a situation where bankers could apply lower capital charges than the 
risk faced (Crouhy et al. 20014). Balin (2008) arrives to the same conclusion, arguing that 
despite being very innovative and well oriented to promote regulatory harmony, Basel I was 
vulnerable to misinterpretation and allowed banks to take excessive risks. In addition, 
Bhowmik and Tewari (2010) examined the case of the Global Trust Bank under the first 
Accord and found out that the lack of regulation related to operational risk was responsible 
for the liquidation of the bank.  
These shortcomings led to the publication of a new capital adequacy framework to replace 
the 1988 Accord. This was done in 2004 with International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards, the so-called “Basel II” Accord. The new framework 
had several revisions over the last one. The most important was the enforcement of a 3-
pillar approach: 
i. Pillar 1 - Minimum Capital Requirements: This pillar refers to the methods used to 
calculate the capital charges for the different risks faced by the bank. The institutions 
were allowed to choose between three different ways to calculate credit risk: the 
Standardized approach, the Foundation Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach and the 
Advanced IRB approach. Operational risk was also incorporated, providing the ability to 
choose between three different models too: the Basic Indicator approach, the 
Literature Review 5 
 
Standardized approach and the Advanced Measurement approach. Market risk 
remained unchanged from the 1996 Amendment. 
ii. Pillar 2 - Supervisory Review Process:  The aim of this pillar was to supervise the risk 
management processes adopted by the banks and intervene when the best practices 
were not implemented, to protect the institution from facing severe losses. 
iii. Pillar 3 – Market Discipline: The last pillar promoted the disclosure of all risk related 
processes, such as the capital structure of the bank, the risk measurement techniques 
followed and their capital adequacy ratios. 
The impact of minimum capital requirements proposed by the two Accords and their 
setbacks have been subject of discussion in the existing literature for many reasons 
(Danielsson, 2001; Santos, 2001; Lastra, 2004). Balin (2008) states that the new accord tries 
to eliminate many of the previous malfunctions, however, it is very complicated and cannot 
be applied on emerging market banks. More relevant to our study, Danielsson et al. (2001) 
criticizes that “statistical financial models do break down in crisis” and “a risk model breaks 
down when used for regulatory purposes”. He provides evidence from the 1998 Russia crisis 
and concludes that VaR, as forecasted by historical data, provides very misleading 
information about institutions’ risk level and can be subject to manipulation. 
The 2008 global financial crisis, confirmed the fears expressed by Danielsson (2002). In the 
outburst of the crisis the existing regulatory framework became outdated and insufficient, 
facing several problems, mainly regarding the credit and market risk. Hence, the Basel 
Committee in order to strengthen the regulatory framework and eliminate the weakness of 
the previous Accords, primarily with regard to market risk, published the Revisions to the 
Basel II market risk framework (Basel, 2009b), which is referred to as Basel 2.5. Three main 
enhancements were included in the 2009 Amendment: 
i. Incremental Risk Charge (IRC) 
ii. Stressed Value-at-Risk (SVaR); and  
iii. Comprehensive Risk Measure (CRM). 
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The IRC measure attempts to mitigate credit rating migrations and default, and in essence 
refers to credit related risk, thus further details are not relevant to this study. SVaR refers 
to the calculation of value at risk from a period of significant financial stress. This addition 
aims as a buffer to the usual VaR methodology, making banks able to cover unexpected 
losses in a highly volatile period, promoting a safer banking environment. The exact 
methods proposed by the Committee for this measure along with the CRM, which serves as 
the capital charge for market risk, are presented in section 4.3 of this study. 
Ultimately, in December 2010 the Committee decided to proceed with a new set of 
agreements, the Basel III Accord (Basel, 2010), as a further response to the recent financial 
crisis. This last framework aims to improve the ability of banks to withstand financial and 
economic shocks and strengthen transparency and disclosure procedures. Basel III 
emphasizes on liquidity by introducing the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable 
Funding ratio (NSF), while promoting changes to the type and amounts of the required 
capital reserves. Significant changes in market risk are not addressed in this framework as 
the related issues had been settled in Basel 2.5. Different parts of the framework are being 
gradually implemented since 2013, while the whole framework should be completely 
adopted until 2019. Walker (2011) argues that the third Accord can help banks improve risk 
management and governance, as well as embrace new transparent procedures. On the 
other side, King and Tarbert (2011) in their in-depth analysis of the proposed reforms appear 
skeptical, especially about how costly the implementation of the new framework can be in 
terms of core capital. More critical about Basel III is Pakravan (2014), stating that the 
framework has failed to capture effectively systematic risk in the past and that adding more 
complex regulations to an already complex system will not work. 
A final note: As of January 2016, Basel Committee has proposed the adoption of a new 
measure to capture market risk, known as expected shortfall, and specifically a liquidity 
adjusted variation. The new market risk measure will come into effect on January 1st, 2019. 
However, this seems a quite problematic approach. As Ming (2014) pointed out from a 
statistical viewpoint, “the newer, more sophisticated risk measure turns out to suffer from 
an intractable mathematical defect of its own”, rising concern about the lack of an easily 
Literature Review 7 
 
implemented backtesting procedure, a procedure that has been crucial for the Committee 
since Basel I. Indeed, in the latest Amendment the backtesting procedure proposed is quite 
complex and should be performed on the basis of each trading desk, something that could 
further raise prudency issues but also makes it very challenging for the academics to test its 
efficiency. 
2.2 VaR related literature 
Since 1970 when the financial system suffered a serious crisis, financial institutions started 
to measure the risk they undertook. The first attempt to measure the risk that a financial 
institution faced, was made by Baumol (1963) when he proposed a measure which was 
based on standard deviation and took into account a confidence level that can be adjusted 
to the user’s attitude to risk. This measure is similar to the well – known Value-at-Risk (VaR), 
which according to Jorion (2006) “summarizes the worst loss over a target horizon that will 
not be exceeded with a given level of confidence” or as McAleer (2009) states is the “worst 
case scenario on a typical day”. The greatest advantage of VaR is that it can describe the 
market risk of a portfolio in a single number (Whitehead, 2011). 
Many different techniques to estimate VaR have been used by professionals and a lot more 
have been tested in the literature. As the results are quite inconclusive, a risk manager has 
to choose among different volatility techniques the one that best fits his interests. In this 
manner, Angelidis and Degiannakis (2005) opined that the approach that generates the 
most accurate results is different depending on the used dataset and that risk professionals 
have to find the best model for their needs and define the right sample size. Similarly, 
Angelidis et al. (2004) argued that “the ARCH structure that produces the most accurate VaR 
forecasts is different for every portfolio”. Taylor’s (1986) and Schwert’s (1989) TS-GARCH 
method, as wells as Nelson’s (1991) EGARCH method were tested among ten different 
GARCH specifications by Bali and Theodossiou (2006) and proved to have the best overall 
performance in calculating both VaR and Expected Shortfall. Giot and Laurent (2003a, b) 
performed a test of VaR models on 6 stock indices and 5 commodity indices for traders that 
hold both short and long positions and argued that the APARCH model under a skewed 
Literature Review 8 
 
student distribution is the best for VaR forecasting and that models based on normal 
distribution tend to underperform. Huang and Lin (2004), analyzing the Taiwan stock index 
futures, confirmed the superiority of the student APARCH model, however they add that for 
lower confidence levels the use of normal distribution is more appropriate. Pafka and 
Kondor (2001) examined the performance of RiskMetrics and found the normality 
assumption to be quite unrealistic and that the model tends to underestimate risk under 
normal distribution, however they agree with Haung and Lin (2004) that models such as 
RiskMetrics can perform satisfactory under normal distribution for lower confidence levels 
as of 95%, where fat tails have minimum effect. Moreover, Degiannakis (2004) implemented 
different models to forecast one-day ahead volatility and daily VaR and concluded that the 
fractional integrated APARCH model with skewed student-t conditionally distributed 
innovations, FIAPARCH (1,1)-skT, is the best to be used by portfolio managers for risk 
calculation purposes.  
On the other side, the APARCH model superiority is not unanimously accepted. Many 
researchers prefer to use simulations to calculate risk. Lambadiaris (2003) performed 
historical and Monte Carlo simulations and concluded that Monte Carlo simulation was 
better for Greek stocks, while for Greek bonds a risk manager should take into account the 
backtesting procedure and the confidence level. In addition, Jackson et al. (1998) examined 
different VaR models implemented by the Bank of England and pointed out that historical 
simulation methods work better than normal VaR methods because they can incorporate 
fat-tailed distributions, while Cabedo and Moya (2003) developed a historical simulation 
method with ARMA forecasts (HSAF), which improved the simple historical VaR estimation. 
Frey and Michaud (1997) used Monte Carlo simulations to project future asset prices and 
the profit and loss distributions and found out that this method can be useful in achieving 
more accurate forecast. Moreover, Filtered Historical Simulation (FHS) was presented by 
Hull and White (1998) as a method being able to combine the historical distribution with 
conditional volatilities, leading to more accurate VaR estimates. Barone-Adesi and 
Giannopoulos (2001) verified that FHS is indeed better than the stand-alone methods, 
especially compared historical simulation, which cannot efficiently capture market 
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movement. Angelidis and Benos (2008), in an examination of the Greek stocks come to the 
same conclusion, but mainly when institutions hold short positions.  
However, despite the above literature leaning towards more complex or flexible models to 
best forecast the risk, Brooks and Persand (2003) tested a variety of models on key UK 
indices and supported that the simplest models, such as the historical average of the 
variance, are adequate in terms of out-of-sample forecasting. Bams et al (2005) added that 
simple models able to consider for tail risk can provide adequate forecast, while the need 
for specification of many parameters in the more complex models lead to overestimation 
of VaR and uncertainty about the prediction. In addition, Vlar (2000) found out that for 
Dutch market instruments, models with naive or simple GARCH variance estimate correct 
VaR forecasts and that normality assumption works better than the student’s t-distribution. 
Moreover, a significant factor that should be considered when calculating VaR is the sample 
size, as supported by Vlaar (2000), who increased the sample size and achieved better 
forecast with historical simulation methods. Hoppe (1998) on the other side, stated that the 
increase in sample size incorporates more outliers, which can overestimate risk, and that 
smaller sample sizes generate more accurate VaR estimations and capture better volatility 
changes. 
Another argument in the volatility prediction, is whether models that use intra-day data 
produce more accurate predictions than the models that use inter-day data. Many 
researchers have been using squared daily returns as a proxy of the true volatility which is 
an unbiased but noisy estimator of the volatility. Thus, intra-day returns should be more 
accurate than daily ones. However, Giot and Laurent (2004) compared the APARCH-skT 
model with an ARFIMAX and found that intra-day data did not improve the VaR model in 
four different examined indexes. In addition, Giot (2005) found that there are no significant 
differences between daily and intra-day VaR models if the seasonality in the volatility of 
intra-day returns is accounted for. More recently, Angelidis and Degiannakis (2008), studied 
the difference between intra-day and inter-day data in risk management, volatility 
forecasting and prediction of option prices, in three European equity markets. The results 
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of this research were contrary, since in volatility forecasting the intra-day model was the 
best, while in the risk management environment the TARCH model under normal 
distribution, produced more accurate results in both confidence levels used. Their results 
showed that there is no model that is adequate in all cases and that a researcher should use 
inter-day or intra-day models depending on the forecast he wants to perform. 
Apart from the methods mentioned above, the calculation of VaR can be adjusted in order 
to take into consideration the liquidity risk of a position. This is called Liquidity adjusted VaR 
(L-VaR). Liquidity risk is an important factor as pointed out by the latest guidelines published 
by the Basel Committee to mitigate risk, and should be considered when calculating VaR 
because it can result in significant losses for the investor. However, according to Amihud 
(2002) it is very difficult to capture all the aspects of liquidity with one measure. Bangia et 
al. (1999) included liquidity risk in the calculation of VaR and constructed a L-VaR measure, 
by classifying illiquidity into two categories: exogenous and endogenous. They concluded 
that if liquidity risk is ignored, VaR tends to underestimate the actual risk. More recently 
Angelidis and Benos (2006) constructed a L-VaR measure which takes into account the 
variation of bid-ask prices and the price effect of position liquidation. They extended a 
model proposed by Madhavan et al. (1997) by incorporating the traded volume and studied 
data from the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) for a seven-month period. Their findings are 
quite interesting, as they conclude that the adoption or not of liquidity risk in the VaR 
calculation should be dependant on the capitalization of the stocks. For high capitalization 
stocks liquidity risk is minimal, thus is not worth taking it under consideration, while for low 
capitalization stock liquidity risk represents almost 11% of the total risk and should not be 
neglected. 
2.3 SVaR related literature 
Literature on SVaR is quite limited. Rossignoloa et al. (2012) conducted a research about the 
new Basel propositions on Emerging and Frontier stock markets. They found out that linear 
models are only sufficient for common market conditions and other techniques capable to 
incorporate large market fluctuations -especially heavy-tailed ones- should be adopted. 
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Additionally, they conclude that SVaR should be separated from the multiplication factor ms 
(more in chapter 4.3.3) as it leads to unnecessary and excessive capital charges. Burchi 
(2013) introduces an opportunity cost function to assess the implementation of SVaR. He 
finds that the capital requirement implied by the new Accord is inefficient from an economic 
viewpoint and banks are discouraged from adopting more sophisticated models that could 
produce capital savings. However, his results indicate an increase in capital charges 
compared to the latest accord ranging from 300 to 700 percent, a very high discrepancy 
from the 110 percent estimated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011) in 
its working paper. Furthermore, Prorokowski and Prorokowski (2014) conducted an 
interview-based approach with nine major banks for matters concerning the 
implementation of the SVaR methodology. They found out that the majority of the banks 
use historical or Monte Carlo simulations to calculate SVaR, all banks have used the 2008 
crisis as the high-stress period and there were no material challenges concerning the 
implementation of the new measures. Finally, Alexander & Ledermann (2012) introduce a 
random orthogonal matrix (ROM) simulation to substitute the historical and Monte Carlo 
simulations used by the practitioners. The advantage of this method is that it can be used 
to provide large samples of stressed data that are not currently available but can also 
incorporate the increase in skewness and kurtosis that are being observed during crises.  
Chapter 3. Methodology 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the theoretical background and the statistical methods 
and models where the empirical part of this thesis was based on. The chapter begins with 
the description of the Value-at-Risk models used. The VaR models are divided into three 
categories: parametric models, where specific assumptions about the distribution fitted to 
the data need to be made; non-parametric models (or historical simulation models) that use 
historical data to estimate the empirical distribution; and finally, semi-parametric models 
where the distribution is obtained from a historical simulation, while the volatility is implied 
by some specific procedure (e.g. GARCH estimated volatility). The chapter ends with the 
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statistical tests that accompanied the evaluation of the performance of the models, through 
the backtesting procedure.  
3.1 Parametric VaR 
The main characteristic of parametric methods is the assumption a risk manager needs to 
make about the data’s distribution or the computation of the statistical quantiles. As McNeil 
et al. (2005, p. 117) states, when such assumptions are being made, one should take under 
consideration the “stylized facts” of the time series, which are empirical observations about 
their distribution that hold true for the majority of them. Among those stylized facts are the 
following: 
i. Return series are not independently and identically distributed, although they show 
little serial correlation. 
ii. Series of absolute or squared returns show profound serial correlation. 
iii. Conditional expected returns are close to zero. 
iv. Volatility appears to vary over time. 
v. Return series are leptokurtic or heavy-tailed. 
vi. Extreme returns appear in clusters. 
The last two problems are quite crucial and can lead to severe miscalculation of the Value-
at-Risk, upraising the need for a solution. The simple moving average method with normal 
distribution assumption for the returns, which is the simplest method to calculate Value-at-
Risk, is not efficient when rare events have high frequency (heavy tails). To overcome this 
problem, a fat-tailed student’s t-distribution can be used instead of the normal one, as 
proposed by the literature. The adoption of a student’s t-distribution though, as McNeil et 
al. (2005, p. 118) found out, is unable to account for volatility clustering, as is the normal 
distribution too. When rare events appear in clusters, it is better to use a conditional 
volatility process that can capture volatility clustering. A process that can account for these 
clusters seems to be the GARCH (1,1) proposed by Bollerslev (1987). 
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Logarithmic returns were used for the financial series, defined as Rt+1 = ln(St+1/St), where Rt+1 
is the return on a given day when St+1 is the closing price of the same day and St is the closing 
price of the previous day.  
3.1.1 Moving average under normal distribution 
The first method applied, also known as variance-covariance method, is a quite simplistic 
approach. Variance is measured as the square of the returns and the forecast for 
tomorrow’s variance is given by the simple average of the most recent m observations, 
according to the following formula:  
𝜎𝑡+1
2 =∑
1
𝑚
𝑅𝑡+1−𝜏
2
𝑚
𝜏=1
 
Furthermore, the returns is assumed to be normally distributed, meaning: 
𝑅𝑡+1  = 𝜎𝑡+1𝑧𝑡+1 , 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑧𝑡+1 ∼  𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0,1) 
where i.i.d. N (0,1) stands for “independently and identically” normally distributed with 
mean equal to 0 and variance equal to 1.  
In this case the daily parametric VaR, given the assumption of zero mean, is calculated as: 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡+1|𝑡
𝑎 = 𝐹𝑎𝜎𝑡+1|𝑡 , 
where Fα is the αth quantile of the standard normal distribution and σt+1|t is the forecast of 
the conditional standard deviation for time t+1, at time t. 
This method is too simplistic and not realistic. It was used though, as it has the advantage 
of quite easy implementation, while the addition of SVaR could improve its effectiveness 
and make it viable. 
3.1.2 Moving average under student’s t-distribution 
As stated earlier, to overcome the problem of heavy tails of the distribution, a student’s t-
distribution could be fitted to the data. Huisman et al. (1998) performed a comparison 
between normal VaR and student’s-t VaR over 18 years on US stock and bond indices and 
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found out that the t-distribution performs better as it assigns more probability to extreme 
events.  
For the calculation of VaR under student’s t-distribution a variation presented by Dowd 
(2005, pp. 159-160) was implemented. The student’s t-distribution can be defined by a 
single parameter, the degrees of freedom v. In this case the distribution will have a zero 
mean, provided v > 1; a variance of v/(v-2), provided v > 2; zero skew, provided v > 3 and a 
kurtosis of 3(v - 2)/(v - 4) provided v > 4. In risk management though, a generalized t-
distribution is preferred, defined as t (a, b, v) = a + b*t(v), where a and b are location and 
scale parameters. This generalized t-distribution has mean a and variance b2v/(v-2), while 
the rest of the moments remain the same. 
Assuming that the returns are distributed as 𝑅~𝑡(𝜈, 𝜇, 𝜎2), 𝐸(𝑅) = 𝜇 and 𝑣𝑎𝑟 = 𝜎2𝜈/(𝜈 −
2), provided that v>2, next day’s VaR is given by the formula: 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡+1|𝑡
𝑎 = 𝜇 + √
𝜈 − 2
𝜈
𝜎𝑡+1|𝑡𝑡𝑎,𝑣  
where μ, σ and v are obtained from the sample of historical returns.  
3.1.3 GARCH model under normal and student’s t-distribution 
The autoregressive condition heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model was introduced by 
Bollerslev (1987) and constitutes a development of the basic ARCH model suggested by 
Engle (1982). The adoption of such a model helps us solve the problem of skewness and 
kurtosis different than those of the standard normal distribution and introduces conditional 
variance innovations, that produce a more accurate estimation of VaR. The definition given 
by McNeil et al. (2005, p.145) was used:  
Let (Zt)𝑡∈ℤ be SWN (0,1). The process (𝑋𝑡)𝑡∈ℤ is a GARCH (p, q) process if it is strictly 
stationary and if it satisfies some strictly positive-valued process (𝜎𝑡)𝑡∈ℤ for all t ∈ ℤ. Then 
the equations are: 
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𝑋𝑡 = 𝜎𝑡𝑍𝑡,          𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝑎0 +∑𝑎𝑖𝑋𝑡−𝑖
2
𝑝
𝑖=1
+∑𝛽𝑗𝜎𝑡−𝑗
2
𝑞
𝑗=1
 
where α0 > 0, αi ≥ 0, i=1, …, p and β j≥ 0, j=1, …, q. 
The previous model allows the variance to depend on the previous p values of the process 
𝑋𝑡−𝑖
2  as well as the previous q volatilities 𝜎𝑡−𝑖
2 . 
The most common version of the model is GARCH (1,1) with Gaussian innovations: 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝜔 + 𝛼𝑋𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2
 
where ω ≥ 0, α, β ≥ 0 and α + β < 1. The last condition ensures that the process is covariance-
stationary. As Dowd (2005) explains, when α is high the volatility reacts very quickly to 
market changes, while when β is high the volatility is more persistent and takes more time 
to change.  
In this study, the GARCH model was used to predict the volatility for the next day. Fitting 
the model in the data, the parameters ω, α and β were obtained, using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimation. Thus, the prediction of volatility is the following:  
𝜎 𝑡+1|𝑡
2 = 𝜔 + 𝛼𝑋𝑡
2 + 𝛽𝜎 𝑡
2
 
where Xt is the last value of the process and σ̂t is the last volatility estimate.  
Assuming standard normal distribution, VaR is calculated by the formula described in 
section 3.1.1 for the moving average model, using however the volatility estimate obtained 
from the GARCH (1,1) process. Hence, next day’s VaR will be: 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡+1|𝑡 = 𝐹𝑎𝜎 𝑡+1|𝑡  
For the t-GARCH model the factor √(𝑣 − 2)/𝜈 was used to scale the corresponding quantile 
and the conditional mean obtained from the sample had to be added. In terms of formula 
this can be presented as follows: 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡+1|𝑡
𝑎 = 𝜇𝑡+1|𝑡 + 𝜎 𝑡+1|𝑡𝑡𝑎,𝜈√(𝜈 − 2)/𝜈  
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3.2 Non-Parametric VaR 
The most well-known and most widely used approach in non-parametric VaR calculation is 
the Historical Simulation (HS). In a survey performed by Perignon & Smith (2010) it was 
reported that 73% of the banks that disclosed their methodology for VaR estimation use 
historical simulation.  This technique assumes that the distribution of future returns can be 
well approximated by the empirical distribution of the past m observations. The VaR with a 
coverage rate of α is then calculated as the 100αth percentile of the distribution formed by 
the past returns, as captured by the histogram of {Rt+1-τ}mt=1. Thus,  
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡+1|𝑡 = 𝐹𝑎  ({𝑅𝑡+1−𝜏|𝑡}𝜏=1
𝑚
) 
This method has the advantage of incorporating non-normal distributions, therefore fat 
tails, and skewness. However, the disadvantage of this method is that it gives equal weight 
on all the past observations and, if the size T of the sample is quite large, the most recent 
observations which could describe the future distribution better, carry the same weight as 
earlier ones. 
3.3 Semi-Parametric VaR 
Both approaches described above face several drawbacks. The parametric methods need 
the risk manager to make certain assumptions of the underlying distribution that may not 
describe accurately the actual distribution of the returns, while the historical simulation has 
significant disadvantages on the volatility estimation and forecasting. The Filtered Historical 
Simulation (FHS), also called Weighted Historical Simulation, tries to combine the best parts 
of the previous two methods and eliminate their drawbacks.  
Hull and White (1998) proposed the incorporation of a GARCH-modelled volatility into the 
historical simulation model. In this case, the variance given by a model-based method, such 
as the GARCH (1,1) process, can be used, but at the same time the empirical distribution of 
past returns is adopted, without the need of any specific assumptions about it. The formula 
to obtain VaR with FHS is: 
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𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡+1|𝑡
𝛼 = 𝐹𝑎  ({𝑧𝑡+1−𝜏|𝑡}𝑡=1
𝑚
) 𝜎𝑡+1|𝑡  
where z are the standardized returns calculated as:  
𝑧𝑡+1−𝑖|𝑡 =
𝑅𝑡+1−𝑖|𝑡
𝜎𝑡+1−𝑖|𝑡
, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 =  1,2, …𝑚 
3.4 Evaluation Framework 
Value-at-Risk calculates the potential losses that are likely to occur within a specified time 
horizon and confidence interval. Besides the calculation of VaR though, the accuracy of 
these predictions should be tested, a process called backtesting. Backtesting is a method for 
simulating a model on past data, in order to measure its accuracy and effectiveness. Two 
different things should be evaluated. First, according to the definition of VaR, the observed 
return 𝑅𝑡+1 should be worse than calculated 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡+1
𝛼  only α∙100% of the time. Thus, if the 
past m VaR forecasts are compared with the past m realized returns, a “hit sequence” can 
be obtained as: 
𝐼𝑡+1 =
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑡+1 < −𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡+1
𝑎  
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑡+1 ≥ −𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡+1
𝑎   
According to Christoffersen (2011, pp. 303), this hit sequence should be completely 
unpredictable, distributed as a Bernoulli variable with an α probability to be 1 and (1-α) 
probability to be zero. 
3.4.1 Unconditional Coverage Testing (Kupiec’s) 
To check if the number of the observed violations is close to the expected one, the test 
proposed by Kupiec (1995) was used. This method tests whether the failure rate of a model 
equals to the expected one and, if T1 is the number of exceptions and T the whole sample, 
the test’s null and alternative hypotheses are: 
H0: T1/T = α  
Η1: T1/T ≠ α 
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Furthermore, since the Kupiec’s test follows the binominal distribution, the appropriate 
likelihood ratio statistic under the null hypothesis is:  
𝐿𝑅𝑈𝐶 = −2 ln[(1 − 𝛼)
𝑇0  𝛼𝑇1/{(1 − 𝑇1/𝑇)
𝑇0(𝑇1/𝑇)
𝑇1}]~ 𝜒1
2  
where T0 and T1 are the number of 0s and 1s respectively, obtained from the “hit sequence” 
process, α is the selected VaR coverage rate and T represents the whole sample. 
3.4.2 Independence Testing (Christoffersen’s) 
The second concept that needs to be evaluated is whether the VaR violations are 
independently distributed. To achieve this the Christoffersen’s Interval Forecast Test (1998) 
was implemented. The importance of this test derives from the fact that clustered violations 
in a model would mean much higher risk of bankruptcy compared to violations that come 
randomly through time. Thus, given that 1) π01 is the probability of having a violation 
tomorrow, conditional on today having no violations and 2) π11 is the probability of 
tomorrow having a violation given that today there was also a violation, needs to be tested 
whether π̂01 statistically differs from π̂11. More precisely we want to test whether π̂11 is 
greater than π̂01. The null hypothesis for this test is: 
Η0: π̂01 = π̂11 with the alternative, 
H1: π̂01 < π̂11. 
The likelihood ratio for the test is: 
𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑑 = −2 𝑙𝑛 [
𝐿( ?̂?)
𝐿(?̂?1)
]~ 𝜒1
2 
where L(Π1) is the likelihood function of the first-order Markov process as: 
𝐿(𝛱1) = (1 − 𝜋01)
𝛵00𝜋01
𝛵01(1 − 𝜋11)
𝛵10𝜋11
𝛵11 
and L(Π) is the likelihood under the alternative hypothesis from the LRuc test. 
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3.4.3 Conditional Coverage Testing 
Lastly, there is the Conditional Coverage Test, which simultaneously tests if the average 
number of VaR violations is correct and if these violations are independent. The statistic 
used to jointly test for independence and correct coverage is: 
𝐿𝑅𝑐𝑐 = −2ln [𝐿(𝑎)/𝐿(?̂?1)]  ~ 𝑥2
2 
which corresponds to testing π01 = π11 = α. Since this approach combines the two tests used 
above, we could say that: 
𝐿𝑅𝑐𝑐 = 𝐿𝑅𝑢𝑐 + 𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑑 
Chapter 4. Empirical Investigation 
4.1 Data 
For the calculation of VaR, stressed VaR models and their evaluation the S&P 500 equity 
index was chosen. The S&P500 index includes the 500 companies with the largest market 
capitalization listed in NYSE or NASDAQ, provides a very good representation of the U.S. 
economy and is widely used in the existing literature. Thus, this will be the single risk factor 
affecting this study’s hypothetical portfolio. 
The data obtained and analyzed, cover a time frame from the start of 1998 to the end of 
2015 and include 4528 observations. This period was selected as it covers the greatest 
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Figure 4.1 S&P 500 daily returns 1998-2015 (source: author, data: Bloomberg database) 
Empirical Investigation 20 
 
economic crisis that the global economy has faced recently, the 2008 sub-prime mortgage 
crisis. The reaction of different VaR methodologies in the crisis and the after-crisis period 
has not been tested much in the literature yet. Moreover, as Prorokowski and Prorokowski 
(2014) found out, 7 out of the 9 banks he surveyed use the 2008-2009 period for the 
calculation of their SVaR, thus it is essential to test the SVaR and the Basel 2.5 Accord during 
this period.  
Figure 4.1 depicts the returns of the S&P 500 index over the examined period. It is obvious 
that from mid-2007 and almost until mid-2009, there is a 2-year period with very extreme 
events, following a very quiet period for the market. Two more spikes of high volatility 
appear during mid-2010 as well as at the start of 2012. From the descriptive statistics 
contained in Table 4.1 it is deducted that the mean of the daily returns is not statistically 
different than zero. The “stylized facts” presented in the methodology section (see Chapter 
3) are being verified by the data, as the series are heavy tailed (kurtosis of 7.5) and have a 
long left tail (negative skewness). Finally, the highest return of the sample (10.96%) was 
observed on October 13, 2008, followed by the highest loss (-9.47%) only two days later, a 
clear sign of volatility clustering.  
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics of the S&P 500 daily returns (1998-2015) 
Observations 4528 
Mean 0.00016 
Variance 0.00016 
Standard Dev 0.01261 
Skewness -0.20173 
Kurtosis 7.53954 
Min -0.09470 
Max 0.10957 
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4.2 Models 
For the calculation of VaR, 6 different models were used, the ones described in Chapter 3. 
Here, it needs to be noted that the use of more complex models would not add any 
explanatory power regarding the effects of SVaR. Additionally, their use is not suggested by 
the Basel Committee after the implementation of Basel 2.5. During the following analysis of 
the results, models containing conditional variance obtained from the GARCH procedure (i.e 
N-G, t-G and FHS) may be referred to as conditional models, while the rest (i.e N-MA, t-MA, 
HS) may be referred to as unconditional models. In Table A. 1 in the appendix, the 
abbreviations used for each model are presented, and it is better to be reviewed before 
moving on to the analysis of the results.  
4.3 Computations and related Basel Framework 
The computations for the empirical investigation can be divided into three steps. First, VaR 
was calculated using the six models mentioned for the scrutinized period and then the 
backtesting procedure to evaluate their performance was implemented. Secondly, the 
stressed VaR was calculated and added to the previous models, and finally VaR, SVaR and 
the backtesting results were used to derive the capital charges according the latest Basel 
Amendment.  
4.3.1 VaR Estimation 
An amount of 4529 adjusted closing prices of the S&P500 (^GSPC) index were obtained from 
the Bloomberg database, corresponding to the period of 1998-2015, and the logarithmic 
returns were calculated. To estimate VaR, a rolling sample of 500 observations was used 
(two years). This specific time frame was chosen because a bigger one would be much 
harder to incorporate recent observations that are more relevant to our forecasts, while a 
smaller one would be greatly affected by outliers, leading to unnecessary high VaR 
estimates and affecting greatly the more sophisticated models and the models based on the 
historical distribution of the returns (i.e. HS, FHS). VaR estimation was restrained to the 
2001-2015 period, while the rest of the data were necessary for the starting sample. 
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Let the quoted time window be WE = 500. To estimate VaR for time t, the latest 500 
observations were used and a projection of VaR for t = WE+1 was derived. After that, time 
window WE moves by one day (the latest observed return in the market is added and the 
oldest one is removed) and an estimation of VaR for time t+1 is calculated and so on, until 
the end of the data is reached. In total, 3773 estimations were made for the period 2001 to 
2015. The latest VaR forecast was performed in time T-1 for time T, as there is not a return 
observed for time T+1 to compare with the forecast. Following the Basel Committee’s 
guidelines (Basel Committee, 2005) for the calculation of VaR, the 99% confidence level was 
used for the estimations. The holding period suggested is 10 trading days, but as the “square 
root of time” rule can be used to transform daily to 10-days forecasts, the transformation 
would not provide better insights to the accuracy of the models or the SVaR impact, thus 
the 1-day forecast was retained in the calculations. 
Following the VaR calculations, the “hit sequence” described in section 3.4 was created. If 
the actual loss in day t is higher than the VaR estimation, calculated in t-1, there is a violation 
observed, denoted as 1, otherwise a 0 is recorded. This hit sequence was afterwards used 
to perform the unconditional coverage test, the independence test and the conditional 
coverage tests as described in sections 3.4.1, 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 respectively. 
4.3.2 Stressed VaR Estimation 
To compute the SVaR, Basel Committee requires a continuous 12-month period of 
significant financial stress (Basel Committee, 2009). Although, it is only stated that the 
review of the identified stress period should be performed at least yearly and no further 
guidelines are provided, which, in addition to the lack of academic literature on the subject, 
made the SVaR estimation quite challenging. Therefore, three questions need to be 
answered: which is the proper stressed period for the calculation of SVaR, how often the 
bank should look for such periods and how they are used, after being identified, to calculate 
SVaR. 
European Banking Authority (2012) suggests two approaches to identify these periods, a 
judgement-based approach or a formulaic approach. As the judgment based approach relies 
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on experts’ judgement, it could not be used and the formulaic approach had to be followed. 
This last method splits again in two ways: 
i. A risk-factor based approach: the institution must identify the relevant, to its portfolio, 
risk factors and then find the period with the highest volatility in a sample of historical 
observations. 
ii. A VaR based approach: the full VaR model should be run over a historical period and then 
the institution has to identify the 12-month period with the highest risk measure. 
The use of 6 models to calculate VaR would make the second approach quite complicated 
and would imply the use of different stressed periods for each one. Moreover, considering 
that the portfolio used has only one risk factor, the equity index, the risk-factor approach 
was adopted by identifying the 250-day long period (equivalent to 12 months) with the 
highest standard deviation.  
Regarding the frequency of the stressed period identification, this was done once per year, 
specifically the first trading day of each year, as part of a “risk framework revaluation” 
process. After identifying the most stressed period within the dataset, the six VaR models 
were implemented using this 250-day window to produce a SVaR estimation. Since the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2009) does not describe any particular model for SVaR 
calculation, consistency between VaR and SVaR estimates was retained, thus, for instance, 
a SVaR estimation with the t-GARCH model would be added to the t-GARCH VaR estimation 
and so on. Ultimately, this SVaR estimation was later used for the whole year and was the 
same for all days, until next year’s first trading day, when the “revaluation process” was 
scheduled. 
4.3.3 Capital Charges within the Basel framework 
According to Basel II, the capital requirement for market risk is calculated as: 
𝑀𝑅𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐷 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥  (𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡−1
𝑎 ,    𝑚𝑐 ·
1
60
·∑𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡−𝑖
𝑎
60
𝑖=1
) 
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where α = 99% and mc is a penalty factor with a minimum value of 3, plus an additional 
factor k that varies from 0 to 1, depending on the performance of the model in the back-
testing procedure i.e. the number of violations in the preceding 250 days. The value of the 
factor k is given by the Basel Committee (2006) as described in Table 4.2: 
Table 4.2 Basel II penalty factor for model violation (source: BC, 2006) 
Zone Violations Value of factor k Multiplier mc 
Green Zone 0 - 4 0.00 3.00 
Yellow Zone 5 0.40 3.40 
 6 0.50 3.50 
 7 0.65 3.65 
 8 0.75 3.75 
 9 0.85 3.85 
Red Zone  10 or more 1.00 4.00 
Afterwards, as the addition of stressed VaR is required by Basel 2.5, the capital charges have 
to be re-estimated. Under the new framework: 
𝑀𝑅𝐶𝑁𝐸𝑊 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡−1
𝑎 ,   𝑚𝑐 ·
1
60
·∑𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡−𝑖
𝑎
60
𝑖=1
)
+𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑆𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡−1
𝑎 ,   𝑚𝑠 ·
1
60
·∑𝑆𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡−𝑖
𝑎
60
𝑖=1
) 
The penalty factor was refreshed daily, following a rolling sample procedure where the 
sample contained the latest 250 observations. With this method, an increase in the relative 
capital charges is ensured as soon as the model starts to underperform. Factor ms for the 
SVaR capital charge was the same as mc, based on the performance of the VaR models. BCBS 
in the Basel II and 2.5 Accords suggests a 10-day long holding period. However, for the ease 
of calculations and to keep consistency between the VaR calculations and the arising market 
risk charges, the 1-day holding period used for VaR remained. Additionally, as both EBA and 
BCBS permit the use of the ‘square root of time’ rule to scale the daily VaR and SVaR to a 
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10-day measure, the transformation would give no further insights on the effects of SVaR 
in the calculation of capital charges. 
4.4 Results from VaR Estimation 
The number of violations for each year of the estimated VaR models are presented in the 
appendix. A summary of the results is presented in Table 4.3 to accompany the analysis, 
while the graphical representation of the VaR estimates for each model is also presented to 
make the discussion more intuitive. Emphasis is being put on the most stressed period (2007 
to 2009), as this is the period where all the models faced many difficulties in providing 
reliable estimates and it is characteristic of how different models react to sudden shifts in 
volatility and volatility clustering. Moreover, being able to overcome such extreme periods 
is the main reason for the implementation of SVaR that is reviewed later. 
Table 4.3 VaR models' violations 
 Violations 
Year Expected N-MA t-MA N-G t-G HS FHS 
2007 2.5 15 13 11 9 11 9 
2008 2.5 28 25 8 4 18 2 
2009 2.5 2 1 2 1 0 0 
2001-2015 37.7 86 67 72 41 53 49 
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Figure 4.2 Normal Moving Average VaR estimation (source: author) 
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Starting with the parametric models, the moving average model under normal distribution 
provided the worst results during the whole sample, having more than double the expected 
number of violations. As it is obvious from Figure 4.2, the model fails to react in sudden 
jumps of volatility during 2008, resulting in 28 violations out of the 2.5 expected. This late 
reaction to the increase of the volatility, is followed by a same late reaction during the 
decrease in volatility in the succeeding years, where the model manages to accommodate 
the decrease in volatility almost two years later, from mid-2010 and on. This of course 
results to quite high estimates of VaR during common market conditions, which is not a 
desirable result.  
The incorporation of the student’s t-distribution in the simple average model to account for 
heavy tails, as shown in Figure 4.3, has similar problems. The performance of the model in 
the stressed period is not improved, producing 13 violations during 2007 and 25 during 
2008, a negligible difference from the normal distribution. For the whole period though, t-
MA model resulted to almost 20 violations less than N-MA, still far from an expected result 
but a significant improvement compared to the standard normal distribution.  
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Figure 4.3 Student's-t Moving Average VaR estimation (source: author) 
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The main problem of the moving average model, as stated before, is that it fails to capture 
volatility clustering and reacts too late to shifts in volatility. This, as can be seen in Figure 
4.4, is significantly improved using conditional GARCH volatility. The model now adapts very 
fast to changes in volatility, following well the returns during the whole sample. For the 
stressed period, the normal GARCH model provided 11 violations during 2007, which is not 
much better than the simple moving average performance. However, the model 
incorporated very fast the increase in volatility, resulting to only 8 violations during 2008, 
which is almost 3 times better than the performance of unconditional volatility models. 
Additionally, normal GARCH reacted evenly well during the years following the crisis, 
managing to adapt immediately to the reduction of volatility. Although, as the model is thin-
tailed, it had 72 underestimations of VaR from 2001 to 2015, pointing to the use of student’s 
t-distribution.  
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Figure 4.4 Normal GARCH VaR estimation (source: author) 
Figure 4.5 Student's-t GARCH VaR estimation (source: author) 
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The t-GARCH model depicted in Figure 4.5, had 9 violations during 2007 but resulted to only 
4 violations during 2008, which is not much higher than the expected number of 2.5 and 
signifies quite a good performance, considering the size of the crisis. Moreover, it had 41 
violations for the whole sample, an almost flawless performance considering the 37.7 
expected violations. These improvements in VaR estimation, resulting from the 
incorporation of conditional GARCH volatility as well as the use of student’s t-distribution, 
provide significant evidence towards the adoption of the mentioned modifications in the 
parametric VaR approach. 
Moving to the non-parametric model, the Historical Simulation (Figure 4.6) seems to have 
the same disadvantages as the moving average models regarding the volatility. The model 
fails to react rapidly to shifts in volatility, both in upwards and downwards movements. The 
change of the estimation window from 500 observations to a smaller one might improve 
the model’s performance. However, this is something out of the scope of this dissertation. 
The use of the historical distribution though, provided an advantage to the Historical 
Simulation over the moving average models, resulting to 11 violations during 2007 and 18 
during 2009 and a total of 51 for the whole sample. The total number of violations for the 
whole sample indicates that, even when combined with the quite inadequate unconditional 
volatility, the historical distribution can provide much more reliable estimations. Although, 
this holds true mainly for periods of common market conditions, considering the 
performance of the model in the most volatile years. 
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Figure 4.6 Historical Simulation VaR estimation (source: author) 
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The final model, Filtered or Weighted Historical Simulation, which is presented in Figure 4.7, 
in theory combines the advantages of the parametric and non-parametric models, thus it 
would be expected to have the best performance. In 2007 it had 9 violations, while during 
2008 it had only 2, a great performance matching the expected number of 2.5 violations. 
Comparing FHS with t-GARCH (the overall most accurate model in terms of violations) from 
their graphical representations in Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.7, FHS provides slightly higher 
estimates of VaR for the whole sample. The total number of 49 violations in the sample, 
compared to the 41 of the t-GARCH model, indicates that FHS, due to the use of historical 
distribution, does not react as well to extreme values when low volatility periods are 
preceding. This could be possibly solved by using different sample sizes for the estimation 
of the historical distribution. 
Table 4.4 P-values for the backtesting models 
 N-MA t-MA N-G t-G HS FHS 
Unconditional Coverage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.597 0.018 0.078 
Independence 0.001 0.001 0.062 0.082 0.007 0.004 
Conditional Coverage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.069 0.000 0.001 
 
Finally, the different methods of VaR estimation were evaluated by three different 
backtesting methods (see section 3.4). In Table 4.4, the p-values of the tests used are 
presented.  The unconditional coverage test goes under the null hypothesis that the number 
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Figure 4.7 Filtered Historical Simulation VaR estimation (source: author) 
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of violations for each model is equal to the one expected. In these terms, both the moving 
average models are rejected, as well as the normal GARCH model. Regarding the Historical 
Simulation, the null hypothesis at 1% level of significance cannot be rejected, while for the 
Filtered Historical Simulation both 1% and 5% levels do not permit the rejection of the null 
hypothesis. Only t-GARCH is accepted at all levels of significance. As for the independence 
test, only the N-GARCH and t-GARCH models can successfully capture the volatility clusters 
at both 99% and 95% coverage levels. Finally, only the t-GARCH model passed the 
conditional coverage test for both 1% and 5% levels of significance. This confirms, as 
indicated by the graph and the number of exceptions analysis earlier, that the GARCH model 
with student’s t-distribution innovations is the only one that performed well during the 
period under scrutiny and could provide reliable VaR estimates in periods of crisis. 
4.5 Results from Stressed VaR Estimation 
As discussed earlier, to calculate the stressed VaR at the first trading day of each year, the 
entire sample of observations until that time was examined to find the 250-day long period 
with the highest volatility. Each new period should be more volatile than the previous one, 
in terms of standard deviation. Six such periods were identified within the 15 years of 
examination, with the last two being different time windows of the 2008 financial crisis. 
Afterwards the SVaR for all six models was calculated, using as an estimation window the 
observations in those stressed periods, and the results are presented in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5 Stressed periods and SVaR estimations 
Stress Period SVaR (%) 
Start End Std. N-MA t-MA N-G t-G HS FHS 
01/03/2000 12/27/2000 1.40 3.27 3.56 3.55 3.87 3.54 3.13 
10/10/2000 10/11/2001 1.46 3.40 3.65 3.40 3.65 3.95 3.34 
01/02/2002 12/27/2002 1.64 3.82 4.10 2.94 3.13 3.70 3.47 
04/30/2002 04/28/2003 1.74 4.04 4.40 3.46 3.76 3.75 3.54 
01/40/2008 12/30/2008 2.60 6.04 6.47 4.95 5.27 9.28 8.58 
07/22/2008 07/17/2009 2.88 6.70 7.27 3.95 4.24 9.28 8.58 
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In some instances, during the GARCH estimations, which affected N-G, t-G and FHS models, 
periods of higher volatility did not provide a higher SVaR estimation. This may have to do 
with where the most extreme values were located in these samples and the smoothing 
effect to older observations by the GARCH model. In these cases, considering the second 
suggestion of the European Banking Authority (2012) for the formulaic approach, the 
previous higher SVaR estimation was used for the rest of the calculations. It is also worth 
noting that the SVaR for the two last periods referring to the 2008 financial crisis are much 
higher than the previous ones, and in some cases like the HS and FHS models, almost 3 times 
as high. 
Following the end of the calculations, the SVaR was added to the VaR estimates.  At the start 
of each year, one SVaR estimation was allocated for each model and remained the same for 
the whole following year, until the next “revaluation of the risk framework”. The size of this 
buffer was so high that almost eliminated the violations for all the models, hence there was 
no point to discuss the results of the backtesting procedure, which can be found in the 
appendix. Table 4.6 presents the number of violations after the addition of SVaR to highlight 
the impact of this buffer.  
Table 4.6 Number of violations after the addition of SVaR 
 Violations 
Model Expected VaR VaR + SVaR 
N-MA 37.73 86 4 
t-MA 37.73 67 4 
N-G 37.73 72 1 
t-G 37.73 41 0 
HS 37.73 53 2 
FHS 37.73 49 0 
4.6 Capital Charges under Basel Framework 
The addition of stressed VaR to the normal one, did not quantify its effect in a manner that 
could be used to provide meaningful comparisons between Basel II and 2.5. For this reason, 
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the minimum capital requirements under both Basel Accords were calculated. In Table 4.7, 
several summary statistics about the Market Risk Capital (MRC) charges under Basel II 
framework are demonstrated, referring to the whole period, as well as the percentage of 
the time that each model remained in the three zones specified by the Basel Committee 
(section 4.3.3). Additionally, Figure 4.8 can be useful to compare graphically the capital 
charges projected from the six models.  
Table 4.7 Market Risk Capital Charges under Basel II (results in %) 
Model Mean Min Max Green Yellow Red 
N-MA 9.20 4.43 20.71 61.9 20.7 17.5 
t-MA 9.98 5.01 22.55 68.4 18.7 12.9 
N-G 8.47 3.83 38.58 56.0 38.3 5.8 
t-G 8.84 4.33 34.49 84.1 15.6 0.3 
HS 10.75 4.60 27.77 79.6 8.8 11.6 
FHS 9.08 3.95 41.15 78.6 21.0 0.3 
Regarding the moving average models, the incorporation of heavy tails (t-MA model) 
resulted in a higher mean during the whole period of 9.98% compared to 9.20% for the N-
MA model. Their max values are not very high compared to other models, especially in 
comparison with the 3 models featuring conditional volatility (i.e. N-G, t-G, FHS), reaching 
only around 20% in contrast to over 40% for the other models. Their late reaction to the 
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Figure 4.8 Market Risk Capital Charges under Basel II (source: author) 
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increase of volatility, that delayed the increase of the VaR estimates and consequently the 
capital charges for this period, is well depictured in Figure 4.8. This late reaction is penalized 
by the factor mc during the next years (the models were in the red zone for the crisis period) 
and as we can see the MRC remained quite high until the end of 2010. The same reaction is 
being observed by the Historical Simulation model. Both its average and max value are 
higher than the two previous models. This model specifically, provides very high capital 
charges for almost 2 years after the crisis, higher than all the other models. That provides a 
very undesirable result, as it forces the institution to keep much more excess capital than 
needed in periods of low volatility, while in periods of stress there is not enough capital to 
cover the institution’s needs. 
The two GARCH models have the lower mean, while their max values are almost double 
than the previous models. This, however, is not something inadmissible, as the max values 
are observed during the crisis, where banks need more capital to cover unexpected losses. 
The normal GARCH model performed worst of all in terms of the penalty factor, being only 
56% of the time in the green zone. On the other side, t-GARCH model was 84% of the time 
in the green zone and completely avoided the red zone (only 12 days in the red zone 
observed in a sample of 3774 observations). The after-crisis performance of these models 
is quite reliable too, as they manage to quickly adapt to the decrease of volatility and lower 
the capital charges. Lastly, FHS avoided the red zone too, however it provided higher capital 
charges than the t-GARCH model in average and a max value 7% higher, reaching a pick of 
41.15%, a quite high value even in periods of financial stress. In this case, it needs to be 
stated that the most favorable result for a model is to provide the lower possible capital 
charges, while still being able to cover unexpected losses.  
Afterwards, the “hit sequence” procedure described in section 3.4, was implemented to 
evaluate the performance of the Basel II accord. The results showed zero violations for all 
the models, which could lead to the induction that even the last accord was adequate in 
terms of capital charges. Despite that, in  a more complex enviroment with multiple risk 
exposures and rising correlations, the simpler models would probably have failed to provide 
adequate market risk charges, but the same cannot be stated for the GARCH models. 
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Table 4.8 Market Risk Capital Charges under Basel 2.5 (results in %) 
Model Mean Min Max Increase 
N-MA 26.25 16.56 44.87 185.46 
t-MA 27.86 18.20 48.42 179.16 
N-G 22.23 14.48 56.60 162.27 
t-G 22.79 15.95 52.40 157.91 
HS 30.96 16.45 64.91 187.92 
FHS 27.20 14.57 66.32 199.58 
After the addition of stressed VaR under the Basel 2.5 directive, the models perform 
similarly as before in terms of mean and max values as can be seen in Table 4.8 and Figure 
4.9. The GARCH models have the lowest mean and max values, lower than the ones 
provided by HS and FHS, but higher than the simpler models. However, it is notable how 
high the difference is between the capital charges required under the two Accords, 
observing an increase of more than 155% for all the models under the new framework, 
compared to Basel II guidelines. The average increase is as high as 179%, which is higher 
than the 110% presented by the Basel Committee (2009a) in its quantitative impact study. 
As expected, models that performed poorly in the initial VaR estimations are now penalized 
even more than before, as they are affected two times by the penalty factor (one for normal 
VaR and one for SVaR). However, the highest increase which is observed for the FHS, is not 
a result of the penalty factor, but primarily due to the very high SVaR estimates for this 
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Figure 4.9 Market Risk Capital Charges under Basel 2.5 (source: author) 
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model. The lowest increase on the other side, is observed for the best performing model, t-
GARCH, with its estimations being increased by almost 158% compared to the Basel II 
framework. A flattering effect among all methodologies can also be observed, especially in 
turbulent periods, as the simpler and worse performing models are penalized by the 
Committee’s multiplication factor, while the more complex models are “penalized” by 
higher SVaR estimates. A final important note: even the minimum capital charge among all 
models (14.48%) would be able to cover the highest loss in the sample (9.5%), which could 
be evidence, on a stand-alone basis, of the Basel 2.5 accord being able to cover severe 
unexpected losses. However, as was proved earlier, Basel II was also able to cover all 
unexpected losses for the entirety of the models. Thus, the comparison between the two 
Accords was essential to avoid misleading interpretation of the results. 
Table 4.9 Comparison between Basel II and 2.5 before and after the crisis (results in %) 
 Basel II Basel 2.5 
 2001-2007 2009-2015 Increase 2001-2007 2009-2015 Increase 
N-MA 7.82 10.49 34.13 19.74 32.79 66.13 
t-MA 8.58 11.25 31.07 21.41 34.22 59.86 
N-G 7.14 8.79 23.04 18.19 25.22 38.61 
t-G 7.78 9.00 15.71 19.58 25.15 28.43 
HS 8.03 13.19 64.27 20.01 42.24 111.09 
FHS 7.37 9.62 30.53 18.04 36.05 99.85 
Finally, Table 4.9 compares the pre-crisis and the after-crisis periods under the two 
frameworks. Originally, would have been expected to face a similar level of increase in the 
capital charges for each model in the after-crisis period, under both frameworks, based only 
on the size of the crisis. However, it is observed that the increase in capital charges in the 
after-crisis period under Basel 2.5, is almost two times the increase observed within the 
Basel II framework. This happens because the stressed period used after 2008 is of a much 
higher volatility than the periods used before the crisis, leading to much higher SVaR 
estimates. Furthermore, Basel 2.5 penalizes two times any violations made by the models, 
for VaR and SVaR respectively. Between the models, the best performing model, t-GARCH, 
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has the lowest increase in capital charges in the post-crisis period under both frameworks. 
The reason is that the moving average models fail to adapt fast enough to the common 
market conditions after the crisis, carrying high capital charges for almost two years later. 
Similarly, the HS and FHS, being based on the historical distribution, operate with a quite 
extreme distribution for two whole years after the crisis. This very high discrepancy between 
the two Accords for the after-crisis period could be evidence for the adoption of a looser 
framework regarding the penalty factor mc, and especially ms used for SVaR, as the addition 
of SVaR is already quite a high buffer and a penalty factor affecting both VaR and SVaR leads 
to unreasonably high capital charges. 
Chapter 5. Conclusion  
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision aims with its latest enhancement concerning 
market risk to address issues risen from the most recent financial crisis of 2008. The 
Amendment introduced a new approach of a stressed Value-at-Risk, based on one-year data 
of financial stress. This action was taken to make the financial system more resilient to 
shocks and to prepare banks for similar adverse movements of the financial markets in the 
future, that Basel II framework was unable to cover in terms of capital adequacy.  
Six different models were tested for the estimation of Value-at-Risk, using 15 years of data 
of the S&P 500 index that worked as a proxy for risk exposure. The GARCH model under 
student’s t-distribution as well as the Filtered Historical Simulation model managed to react 
quite fast to the shifts in volatility and provided reliable VaR estimates during the crisis. The 
use of simpler models overestimates the risk for the whole sample, due to delayed reaction 
to the reduction of volatility, and at the same time proves to be insufficient during more 
stressed periods. For the whole 15-year period only one model could pass the backtesting 
procedure, the GARCH model with student’s t-distribution innovations. These results 
provide strong evidence towards the use of distributions able to capture heavy tails, such 
as student’s t-distribution, as well as procedures that can incorporate volatility clustering, 
like a GARCH process. 
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Subsequently, the stressed VaR was calculated for six different periods, each one having 
higher volatility than the previous. The SVaR procedure was similar to the one used to 
calculate VaR and consistency was kept between VaR and SVaR methodologies. After the 
addition of the SVaR to the normal one, an extreme decrease in the number of violations 
was noticed for all the models, with the previously worst performing models (i.e. N-MA, t-
MA, N-GARCH) having as low as 4 violations for the whole sample, while the most 
sophisticated models had 0 violations. This means that more complex methods with the 
addition of SVaR alone, could provide adequate market risk estimates, even in such volatile 
market conditions.  
The calculation of the relevant capital charges under the two Basel Accords provided further 
understanding on the workings of SVaR. Under Basel II, the models incorporating GARCH 
volatility, and especially t-GARCH and FHS, managed to produce lower capital charges in 
terms of mean, while avoiding completely the red zone as specified in the Basel Accord (i.e. 
less than ten violation in the preceding 250 days). The rest of the models faced increased 
capital charges, mainly due to the penalties imposed for poor performance by the 
Committee guidelines. The backtesting process indicated that even the Basel II Accord was 
able to cover the capital needs of the institution in our study, which however does not take 
into account advanced risk correlations.  
The addition of SVaR under Basel 2.5, resulted to an average increase of 179% in the capital 
charges compared to the previous Accord. This is an increase more than the 110% presented 
by the Basel Committee in its quantitative impact study (2009a), but lower than what other 
studies in past literature have found. In general, the models of conditional variance tend 
once more to perform better in terms of mean, while staying out of the red zone. Under 
Basel 2.5, poor performing models are penalized 2 times by the specific multiplication factor 
(both for VaR and SVaR estimations), leading to excessive capital charges, something that 
should arise consideration on modifying the penalty factor or its use. Additionally, more 
sophisticated models like the Filtered Historical Simulation provide very high SVaR 
estimates compared to the simpler models, raising substantially the required capital 
reserve.   
Conclusion 38 
 
Ultimately, the same results achieved by SVaR could be achieved by the implementation of 
a single high capital charge (e.g. of 10%) over and above the charge obtained by the common 
VaR methodology. Basel 2.5 framework does not reward the ability to accurately forecast 
market risk and constantly provides quite high capital charges, even for the most complex 
models that were able to cope with the recent financial crisis. This could force banks to limit 
their exposure to products subject to market risk. Although, as banks widely use these 
products for hedging techniques, exposure to different kinds of risk could be increased and 
the Accord could cause more problems than it solves. Moreover, due to the smoothening 
and flattering effect SVaR has among the different VaR methodologies, it deprives the 
incentive for the use of more sophisticated models in the estimation of Value-at-Risk. 
However, simpler models with their late reaction to market conditions, can overestimate 
risk for as long as two years after the crisis, binding capital that elsewise could be used in 
more productive activities and forcing the banks to hold more capital when they least need 
it, but less capital when they need it the most. 
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Appendix 
Table A. 1 Abbreviations used for the VaR models 
Model Abbreviation Section 
Moving Average under normal distribution N-MA 3.1.1 
Moving Average under student’s t-distribution  t-MA 3.1.2 
Normal-GARCH N-G 3.1.3 
Student’s-t-GARCH t-G 3.1.3 
Historical Simulation HS 3.2 
Filtered Historical Simulation FHS 3.3 
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Table A. 2 Violations of the 99% VaR estimate on the S&P 500 daily log returns 
Number of Violations 
 VaR model 
Year Expected N-MA t-MA N-G t-G HS FHS 
2001 2.48 3 3 2 2 3 2 
2002 2.52 5 5 4 4 4 4 
2003 2.52 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2004 2.52 0 0 4 0 0 4 
2005 2.52 0 0 3 1 1 3 
2006 2.51 4 3 5 2 4 5 
2007 2.51 15 13 11 9 11 9 
2008 2.53 28 25 8 4 18 2 
2009 2.52 2 1 2 1 0 0 
2010 2.52 0 0 5 2 0 1 
2011 2.52 9 6 7 5 4 5 
2012 2.5 0 0 3 1 0 1 
2013 2.52 0 0 4 2 0 3 
2014 2.52 9 5 6 3 1 5 
2015 2.52 10 6 8 5 6 5 
Total 37.73 86 67 72 41 53 49 
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Table A. 3 Statistics and likelihoods of the backtesting procedure (VaR) 
 VaR Model 
 N-MA t-MA N-G t-G HS FHS 
T0 3686 3705 3700 3731 3719 3723 
T1 86 67 72 41 53 49 
T00 3608 3644 3632 3692 3670 3678 
T01 78 61 68 39 49 45 
T10 78 61 68 39 49 45 
T11 8 6 4 2 4 4 
p̂ 2.28% 1.78% 1.91% 1.09% 1.41% 1.30% 
L(p̂) 7.27E-179 7.57E-147 1.76E-155 5.97E-99 9.40E-122 2.67E-114 
L(p) 8.15E-189 6.74E-151 7.08E-161 5.19E-99 5.85E-123 5.62E-115 
p̂01 2.12% 1.65% 1.84% 1.05% 1.32% 1.21% 
p̂11 9.30% 8.96% 5.56% 4.88% 7.55% 8.16% 
L(p̂1) 2.09E-176 1.46E-144 1.01E-154 2.70E-98 3.72E-120 1.83E-112 
LRuc 45.822 18.653 24.848 0.280 5.553 3.114 
LRind 11.319 10.520 3.495 3.018 7.355 8.459 
LRcc 57.141 29.174 28.343 3.298 12.908 11.573 
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Table A. 4 Statistics and likelihoods of the backtesting procedure (VaR + SVaR) 
 VaR Model 
 N-MA t-MA N-G t-G HS FHS 
T0 3768 3768 3771 3772 3770 3772 
T1 4 4 1 0 2 0 
T00 3764 3764 3770 3772 3768 3772 
T01 4 4 1 0 2 0 
T10 4 4 1 0 2 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 
p̂ 0.11% 0.11% 0.03% 0.00% 0.05% 0.00% 
L(p̂) 2.32E-14 2.32E-14 9.75E-05 N/D 3.81E-08 N/D 
L(p) 3.58E-25 3.58E-25 3.47E-19 3.44E-17 3.50E-21 3.44E-17 
p̂01 0.11% 0.11% 0.03% 0.00% 0.05% 0.00% 
p̂11 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% N/D 0.00% N/D 
L(p̂1) 2.33E-14 2.33E-14 9.76E-05 N/D 3.81E-08 N/D 
LRuc 49.792 49.792 66.540 N/D 60.032 N/D 
LRind 0.008 0.008 0.001 N/D 0.002 N/D 
LRcc 49.801 49.801 66.540 N/D 60.035 N/D 
 
  
Appendix 48 
 
Table A. 5 Minimum capital requirement for N-MA (results in %) 
 Basel II Zone Basel 2.5 
Year Mean Min Max Green Yellow Red Mean Min Max 
2001 9.24 8.74 9.59 248 0 0 19.04 18.54 19.39 
2002 10.11 8.90 11.97 148 104 0 20.88 19.10 23.53 
2003 11.11 9.77 12.23 117 135 0 23.49 21.22 25.59 
2004 8.79 6.60 9.76 252 0 0 20.91 18.72 21.89 
2005 5.36 4.74 6.58 252 0 0 17.48 16.86 18.71 
2006 4.62 4.50 4.74 251 0 0 16.75 16.63 16.87 
2007 5.50 4.43 7.34 96 68 87 19.57 16.56 23.51 
2008 9.80 7.36 16.23 0 0 253 25.96 23.53 32.39 
2009 19.10 15.47 20.71 31 20 201 42.34 32.50 44.87 
2010 14.87 11.59 15.47 252 0 0 34.97 31.69 35.56 
2011 9.30 7.30 11.52 158 94 0 31.13 27.40 37.24 
2012 10.25 8.25 11.70 94 156 0 33.79 28.35 37.49 
2013 7.74 5.75 8.28 252 0 0 27.84 25.85 28.38 
2014 5.45 4.87 6.32 184 68 0 26.72 24.97 32.11 
2015 6.71 6.16 7.76 0 134 118 32.76 31.28 34.56 
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Table A. 6 Minimum capital requirement for t-MA (results in %) 
 Basel II Zone Basel 2.5 
Year Mean Min Max Green Yellow Red Mean Min Max 
2001 10.17 9.77 10.47 248 0 0 20.86 20.45 21.16 
2002 10.95 9.64 12.94 148 104 0 22.52 20.60 25.36 
2003 11.96 10.76 12.95 124 128 0 25.10 23.07 26.90 
2004 9.77 7.44 10.75 252 0 0 22.95 20.63 23.94 
2005 6.06 5.33 7.43 252 0 0 19.25 18.52 20.62 
2006 5.19 5.08 5.33 251 0 0 18.38 18.27 18.52 
2007 5.99 5.01 8.27 141 69 41 20.75 18.20 25.86 
2008 10.82 8.28 17.58 0 0 253 28.41 25.87 35.17 
2009 20.57 16.91 22.55 36 24 192 45.27 35.28 48.42 
2010 16.36 12.98 16.91 252 0 0 38.17 34.80 38.72 
2011 10.07 8.26 12.91 182 70 0 32.80 30.08 37.04 
2012 10.72 9.22 11.86 102 148 0 34.69 31.03 37.31 
2013 8.69 6.57 9.24 252 0 0 30.51 28.39 31.05 
2014 6.08 5.57 6.55 194 58 0 28.56 27.39 31.13 
2015 6.28 5.63 7.61 148 104 0 29.57 27.45 33.79 
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Table A. 7 Minimum capital requirement for N-G (results in %) 
 Basel II Zone Basel 2.5 
Year Mean Min Max Green Yellow Red Mean Min Max 
2001 9.65 8.19 10.75 248 0 0 20.29 18.83 21.40 
2002 10.38 8.03 15.28 244 8 0 21.07 18.67 27.34 
2003 8.65 6.43 11.57 252 0 0 19.29 17.08 22.21 
2004 5.36 4.70 6.40 252 0 0 16.01 15.35 17.04 
2005 4.69 4.41 5.07 242 10 0 15.39 15.06 17.13 
2006 4.82 4.05 5.80 143 108 0 16.07 14.69 17.86 
2007 6.47 3.83 10.04 29 172 50 19.24 14.48 24.23 
2008 15.54 9.90 38.58 0 85 168 29.42 22.85 51.88 
2009 17.59 8.37 38.16 78 174 0 34.71 23.23 56.60 
2010 8.81 6.38 13.31 152 100 0 24.45 21.23 30.14 
2011 9.53 5.46 17.86 98 154 0 26.00 20.31 35.93 
2012 7.49 5.33 14.48 104 146 0 23.80 20.18 32.55 
2013 5.71 5.03 6.53 195 57 0 21.01 19.89 23.36 
2014 5.45 4.43 6.36 75 177 0 21.75 19.29 23.69 
2015 6.95 5.25 9.84 0 252 0 24.79 22.08 28.90 
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Table A. 8 Minimum capital requirement for t-G (results in %) 
 Basel II Zone Basel 2.5 
Year Mean Min Max Green Yellow Red Mean Min Max 
2001 10.63 8.98 11.83 248 0 0 22.24 20.60 23.45 
2002 11.26 8.74 16.56 244 8 0 22.93 20.36 29.73 
2003 9.40 7.07 12.53 252 0 0 21.02 18.69 24.15 
2004 5.99 5.32 7.03 252 0 0 17.60 16.94 18.65 
2005 5.30 5.07 5.56 252 0 0 16.92 16.69 17.17 
2006 5.11 4.49 5.73 251 0 0 16.73 16.10 17.35 
2007 6.78 4.33 10.83 141 98 12 19.63 15.95 25.87 
2008 15.06 9.02 33.86 67 186 0 28.68 20.64 45.48 
2009 17.22 9.07 34.49 144 108 0 33.90 24.87 52.40 
2010 9.17 6.96 13.35 252 0 0 24.96 22.75 29.15 
2011 10.18 6.06 18.47 148 104 0 26.85 21.86 36.37 
2012 7.69 5.93 14.98 234 16 0 23.63 21.73 32.89 
2013 6.27 5.49 7.24 252 0 0 22.07 21.29 23.04 
2014 5.68 5.11 6.26 252 0 0 21.48 20.91 22.06 
2015 6.79 5.20 9.71 185 67 0 23.14 21.00 27.61 
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Table A. 9 Minimum capital requirements for HS (results in %) 
 Basel II Zone Basel 2.5 
Year Mean Min Max Green Yellow Red Mean Min Max 
2001 9.35 8.42 10.49 248 0 0 19.96 19.03 21.10 
2002 9.99 9.46 11.42 244 8 0 21.88 21.10 24.84 
2003 10.86 10.36 11.90 179 73 0 23.17 22.21 25.32 
2004 9.53 6.96 10.36 252 0 0 21.38 18.81 22.21 
2005 5.20 4.60 6.96 252 0 0 17.05 16.45 18.80 
2006 4.73 4.60 4.88 251 0 0 16.57 16.45 16.73 
2007 6.51 4.79 10.25 96 114 41 20.04 16.63 26.04 
2008 12.80 10.27 24.03 0 39 214 28.40 24.24 39.83 
2009 25.88 20.83 27.77 56 12 184 60.70 40.03 64.91 
2010 20.14 14.79 20.83 252 0 0 48.00 42.65 48.68 
2011 11.07 9.45 14.70 252 0 0 38.93 37.30 42.55 
2012 11.55 11.20 11.92 250 0 0 39.41 39.06 39.77 
2013 10.21 6.99 11.20 252 0 0 38.07 34.84 39.06 
2014 6.64 6.33 6.97 252 0 0 34.50 34.18 34.83 
2015 6.74 6.23 8.08 167 85 0 36.09 34.09 40.57 
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Table A. 10 Minimum capital requirements to FHS (results in %) 
 Basel II Zone Basel 2.5 
Year Mean Min Max Green Yellow Red Mean Min Max 
2001 10.54 8.78 11.79 248 0 0 19.94 18.18 21.19 
2002 10.54 7.96 15.57 244 8 0 20.61 17.99 26.93 
2003 8.71 6.36 11.87 252 0 0 19.13 16.78 22.19 
2004 5.23 4.51 6.32 252 0 0 15.84 15.12 16.90 
2005 4.58 4.25 4.89 242 10 0 15.26 14.86 16.92 
2006 4.83 4.05 5.99 143 108 0 16.06 14.67 18.03 
2007 7.17 3.95 12.32 65 174 12 19.43 14.57 25.95 
2008 17.24 10.30 41.15 100 153 0 29.24 20.92 51.77 
2009 19.43 10.19 40.71 252 0 0 45.12 35.94 66.32 
2010 9.80 6.73 14.41 252 0 0 35.55 32.48 40.16 
2011 10.59 5.58 20.69 150 102 0 37.73 31.33 49.88 
2012 8.30 6.19 16.79 234 16 0 34.27 31.94 45.97 
2013 6.27 4.94 7.71 252 0 0 32.03 30.69 33.46 
2014 5.66 4.74 6.81 134 118 0 33.02 30.49 35.99 
2015 7.28 5.18 11.15 148 104 0 34.61 30.93 41.19 
 
